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Economic Perspective 2 
REFLECTIONS CM THE MINERS' DISPUTE 
Cliff Lockyer and Chris Baldry, Department of Industrial Relations 
University of Strathclyde 
BACKGROUND 
Paradoxically, the ending of the dispute 
between the National Union of Mineworkers 
and the National Coal Board has raised 
several questions and potent ial problems 
rather than led to any enduring solutions. 
The ending of the dispute without an 
agreement, the high numbers of miners 
applying for voluntary redundancy, and the 
recent acceptance of the 5.2% wage offer 
refused eighteen months ago, al l prompt a 
questioning of the causes and consequences 
of the dispute. The conduct and ending 
of the dispute also ra ise a number of 
important issues as to the future pattern 
of industrial relations within the mining 
industry and in Bri tain generally. In 
addition, the actions of those involved 
indicate important changes in the roles of 
the law, the police and Government in 
collective bargaining arrangements and in 
the handling of disputes, especially in 
the public sector. 
In d i scuss ing the d i spu te and i t s 
implications, i t i s f i r s t necessary to 
understand the extent to which the causes 
of the d i s p u t e , the conduct of the 
Government, Police, NCB and NUM, and even 
the outcome were d i rec t ly influenced by 
the 1972 and 1974 na t iona l mining 
disputes. 
The 1972/4 disputes, occurring at the same 
time as the Middle East oil cr is is , led to 
a t r i p a r t i t e agreement between the 
Government, NCB and NUM as to future 
output and investment levels for the 
industry - The Plan for Coal. However, 
these two national disputes were possibly 
more important for the l essons they 
offered to the par t ies involved - NUM, 
NCB, Government and Police Forces - rather 
than the plans for increasing capacity. 
The NUM learned, from the actions a t the 
Gas Board's coke depot a t S a l t l e y , 
Birmingham, the value of mass picketing 
and mass support from other t rade 
unionists. I t based i t s strategy for the 
1984 dispute on such mass action, and on 
the assumption tha t i t would receive 
extensive, and mass support, from the 
other unions in the Triple Alliance (steel 
and ra i l ) , and from the labour movement as 
a whole. However, times had changed. 
The r i s e in unemployment weakened the 
support from trade unionists, the failure 
to involve the Nottinghamshire area in the 
dispute and to conduct a ballot seriously 
weakened support from transport workers. 
The s teel union element of the Triple 
A l l i a n c e , weakened a f t e r t h e i r 
'confrontation' with Mr MacGregor four 
years e a r l i e r , feared that i f a major 
steel works such as Ravenscraig, closed as 
a consequence of the strike i t might never 
reopen. The mining indus t ry had a lso 
changed in the intervening decade. The 
gradual decline in the number of pits had, 
in many areas, weakened the t rad i t iona l 
link between the village and the pit, the 
major source of so l idar i ty at p i t level . 
I t was noticeable during the dispute that 
the percentage of miners returning to work 
before the end of the stoppage was lowest 
where the relationship between the pit and 
the local village was s t i l l largely intact 
(eg South Wales). 
More significantly, the police learned the 
need for greater co-ordination in the face 
of such 'mass' action. The Association 
of Chiefs of Police Officers had formed 
the National Recording Centre (NRC) in 
1972 to enable the effective movement of 
police between forces to provide adequate 
policing during major events. The NRC 
had been activated during the 1972 miners' 
d i s p u t e , but by 1984 was a f a r more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d and important agency. 
F i r s t , i t could ca l l on the support of at 
l eas t 11,000 officers from a l l 43 police 
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forces. Secondly, the police provided 
under this mutual aid scheme were largely 
drawn from the ranks of the Police Support 
Units and Special Patrol Groups, and as 
such were riot-trained. Thirdly, the NRC 
could access the police national computer, 
and during this dispute this faci l i ty was 
used to record the vehicle licence number 
of pickets ' cars . Within a week of the 
s tar t of the strike ACPO had organised an 
emergency police force from 18 different 
police forces and were stopping vehicles 
con ta in ing p i c k e t s a t cons ide rab le 
distances from the picket lines. 
In both 1972 and 1974 the NCB had come to 
app rec i a t e t h a t i ndus t ry -wide wage 
bargaining, following the National Power 
Loading Agreement of 1966, had unified the 
different coal f ie lds to the extent that 
these stoppages in the early 1970s were 
the f i r s t national strikes in the industry 
since 1926. 
Accordingly, i t sought the progressive 
introduction of p i t head and regional 
incentive/bonus schemes which, when linked 
to selective investment plans, would widen 
d i f f e ren t i a l s between areas and thus act 
to weaken so l ida r i t y . Whilst there i s 
much to suggest that by 1983 the NCB 
incentive scheme was in a shambles i t 
nevertheless led to significant variations 
in bonus payments (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Average bonus payments, investment and operating 
costs per tonne by liCB area 
Av Bonus Colliery Operating 
payments bonu3 Investment costs per 
UCB area 
North Yorkshire 
Barnsley 
North Nottingham 
North Derbyshire 
South Yorkshire 
North East 
South Midlands 
Western 
South Nottingham 
South Wales 
Doncaster 
Scotland 
on faces 
£pw 
60.75 
56.25 
52.15 
51.65 
51.35 
49.50 
46.60 
11.00 
12.15 
31.50 
27.10 
22.20 
1 averages 
£pw 
17.85 
12.60 
38.10 
39.80 
12.00 
33.80 
31.60 
29.65 
31.25 
21.70 
21.10 
11.75 
per head2 
(SOOO's) 
23.1 
24.9 
21.9 
19.2 
17.2 
12.3 
19.2 
18.7 
16.7 
11.4 
20.7 
10.9 
tonne 
£ 
37.2 
37.4 
32.1 
33.8 
40.3 
42.8 
36.2 
40.5 
36.0 
58.8 
39.1 
42.6 
Figures relate to the las t week of April 1983 
2 Investment fiRures relate to seven vears investment 
Sources: Incomes Data Beport No 424, May 1981 
Labour Research, September 1983 and 
NCB Accounts 
The investment f igures per head (for a 
seven year per iod) c l e a r l y show how 
investment has been concentrated in the 
•central mining areas ' ra ther than in 
peripheral areas such as Scotland and 
South Wales. This p a t t e r n of high 
investment in a l imited number of areas, 
to c r e a t e a number of ' super p i t s ' 
employing the l a t e s t computer-aided 
techniques, and only minimal investment 
elsewhere, has created further divisions 
within the NUM. In Scotland and South 
Wales the c a l l has been for f u r t he r 
investment to protect jobs, whils t in 
Yorkshire, Not ts , Derbyshire and the 
Midlands the effect of investment in 
'super-pits' had been to shut many smaller 
p i t s and, despite i n t e r - p i t t ransfers , 
reduce the overall number of jobs because 
of the lower manning levels on automated 
faces. 
To the Government, the experience of 
1972/4 reinforced the need to monitor the 
actions of those leading such national 
a c t i o n and e q u a l l y t o r e d u c e i t s 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y to na t i ona l stoppages. 
Previous administrations had employed the 
Secret Service to monitor union leaders 
and a c t i v i s t s . Both Conservative and 
Labour Admin i s t r a t i ons had used the 
Cabinet Office's operations centre (COBRA) 
with i t s d i r e c t con tac t between the 
cabinet and chief constables. The main 
policy i n i t i a t i v e in the 1970s had been 
t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e C i v i l 
Contingencies Unit (CCU) located in the 
Cabinet Office, which became the main 
Government instrument for dealing with 
major stoppages (Beynon & McMylor in 
Beynon, H (ed) Digging Deeper, Verso, 
London, 1985). While these institutions 
of State control had been developed and 
refined under both Labour and Conservative 
Governments, i t i s the symbolic importance 
to the Conservative Party of the miners* 
v i c to ry in 1974 which should not be 
overlooked. The b i t t e r defeat of the 
party in 1974, arising out of the dispute, 
was a major factor in the party's adoption 
of the pol ic ies of Friedman, Hayek and 
Joseph in the l a t e 1970s. One of Mrs 
Thatcher's f i r s t steps, on becoming leader 
of the Conservative Party, had been to 
seek a report from Lord Carrington, the 
Energy Minister in 1974, on the lessons to 
be drawn from the 1974 dispute. This 
report highlighted the bargaining power of 
r e l a t i v e l y small groups of organised 
employees in the energy genera t ing 
indus t r ies . The 'Ridley Report', leaked 
to the Economist in May 1978, represented 
the Conservative party's strategy to deal 
with such threats. 
The 'Report' was a set of conclusions 
reached by a Conservative Party Policy 
Group, chaired by Nicholas Ridley, as to 
the necessary steps for the piecemeal 
privatisation of extensive sections of the 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s by a fu ture 
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Conservative Government. The f i r s t s teps 
would be t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t r i c t 
f i n a n c i a l t a r g e t s . The Po l i cy Group 
r e c o g n i s e d t h a t t h i s w o u l d e v o k e 
challenges from the unions over wages and 
redundancies and t h a t these should not be 
avoided but fought head-on, on pre-chosen 
g r o u n d . F o l l o w i n g C a r r i n g t o n , i t 
p inpoin ted the coa l i n d u s t r y as t h e most 
l i k e l y b a t t l e g r o u n d , and i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
cer ta in s teps should be taken to prevent a 
r e p e a t of 197^- In many r e s p e c t s t h e s e 
recommendations (the c a l l to build up coal 
s t o c k s , i n t roduce dual c o a l / o i l - f i r i n g 
where p o s s i b l e i n power s t a t i o n s , 
encourage h a u l i e r s t o employ non-union 
l o r r y d r i v e r s , e s t a b l i s h a l a r g e , mobi le 
squad of p o l i c e equipped t o dea l wi th 
picketing, l ega l r e s t r i c t i o n s on picketing 
and reducing of s o c i a l s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s 
t o s t r i k e r s 1 dependents) c o n s t i t u t e d the 
b l u e p r i n t f o r t h e f i r s t y e a r s of 
Conservative Government. 
The NUM came n e a r t o a n a t i o n a l 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e NCB o v e r p i t 
c l o s u r e s in 1981. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
1981 t o the 1984 s t r i k e p a r a l l e l s t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of the 1921 s toppage t o the 
G e n e r a l S t r i k e of 1926 i n t h a t t h e 
Government's plans t o deal with the th rea t 
of n a t i o n a l a c t i o n by the NUM were s t i l l 
incomplete. There i s evidence to suggest 
tha t the NCB played on t h i s unreadiness to 
' l e v e r ' a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , 
above the f i n a n c i a l l i m i t s , from t h e 
Government t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t the s t r i k e 
was c a l l e d off. The i n s i s t e n c e by the 
NCB t h a t the r a t e of c o l l i e r y c l o s u r e s 
would have to increase and the appointment 
of Mr MacGregor as Chairman in 1982, 
sounded new alarm b e l l s fo r the NUM but 
c a n be s e e n a s r e p r e s e n t i n g an 
a c c e l e r a t i o n of the p roces s of ' s l imming 
down' the industry to a core of prof i tab le 
a u t o m a t e d ' s u p e r p i t s ' t h a t had been 
u n d e r w a y s i n c e t h e l a t e 1 9 7 0 s . 
MacGregor's appointment i s a l s o a symbol 
of breaking with the conventional pa t te rns 
of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s in the i ndus t ry 
which had been based on a common 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and commitment t o the 
industry and, in the Ezra/Gormley era , had 
l ed t o a c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
Chairman of t h e NCB and P r e s i d e n t of the 
NUM. 
By 1984 the Government was prepared t o 
w e a t h e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a l o n g 
stoppage. The s t r i k e was to be presented 
as t h e f i n a l d e f e a t of the exces se s of 
t r a d e un ion power . The p o l i c y of 
i s o l a t i n g t h e m i n e r s was v i r t u a l l y 
c o m p l e t e v i a h i g h e r t h a n e x p e c t e d 
s e t t l e m e n t s in e l e c t r i c i t y and gas t o 
reduce t h e l i k e l i h o o d of such groups 
a c t i v e l y s u p p o r t i n g the miners ; t h i s 
'buying o f f of support was to be extended 
t o r a i l and dock w o r k e r s d u r i n g t h e 
s t r i k e . The Government was committed to 
t h i s po l i cy of d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n for 
e s sen t i a l ly three reasons. F i r s t , t rends 
in energy consumption, suggested a l o n g -
term and c o n s i d e r a b l e d e c l i n e i n the 
demand for coal and the world market price 
f o r c o a l f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d t h e 
' expens iveness ' of B r i t i s h c o a l . This 
questioned the appropriateness of the 1974 
Plan for Coal as a long-term s t ra tegy for 
t h e i n d u s t r y and suggested a need t o 
reduce c a p a c i t y e s p e c i a l l y of the most 
'uneconomic' p i t s . Secondly, t h e Plan for 
Coal r ep re sen t ed t h e outmoded i dea s of 
v o l u n t a r i s m , t r i p a r t i s m , consensus and 
p lanning , a l l h e r e s i e s t o the new creeds 
of i n d i v i d u a l i s m and t h e f r e e market 
economy. Above a l l , i t ' demons t ra ted ' 
t h e e f f e c t s of t h e monopoly powers of 
t r a d e unions on t h e labour market and on 
the democra t ic p roces se s of government, 
and hence the need for a l e g i s l a t i v e and 
indus t r i a l policy which would c u r t a i l such 
excessive t rade union powers. 
The t h i r d f a c t o r was the Conserva t ive 
P a r t y ' s po l i cy of p r i v a t i s i n g t h e pub l i c 
s e c t o r . The p o l i c y g r o u p on t h e 
n a t i o n a l i s e d i n d u s t r i e s , c h a i r e d by 
Nicholas Ridley (see the Economist, 27 May 
1978, p21) concluded t h a t the g r e a t e s t 
opportuni t ies for d e n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n were 
in coa l , s h i p b u i l d i n g , docks, a i r p o r t s , 
motor car manufacture, buses and freight . 
I t s p e c i f i c a l l y sugges ted : the t ransfer 
of l i c e n s i n g of p r i v a t e coal mines from 
t h e Nat iona l Coal Board t o the Min i s t e r 
and the r e s t r i c t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s of 
l icence to safety considerations only; the 
t ransfer of coal r oya l t i e s from the NCB to 
the s t a t e and the encouragement, wherever 
p o s s i b l e , of worker c o - o p e r a t i v e s a t the 
s m a l l e r p i t s . The f i r s t s t age would be 
t o r e s t r u c t u r e t h e i n d u s t r y i n t o a 
prof i table and saleable form. Success in 
' d e f e a t i n g ' t h e miners would hold down 
labour c o s t s and make those s e c t i o n s of 
t h e i n d u s t r y t h a t have r ece ived high 
amounts of i nves tmen t s look even more 
a t t r a c t i v e t o p r i v a t e p u r c h a s e r s . The 
Government's c u r r e n t preoccupat ion wi th 
'world market' coal pr ices i n i t i a l l y seems 
s t r a n g e , given the t r a d i t i o n a l minimal 
par t ic ipa t ion in such markets by both the 
NUM and t h e major c o a l p u r c h a s e r s . 
However, i t would make sense i f s e c t i o n s 
of the mining i n d u s t r y were purchased by 
mult inat ional mining and o i l corporations. 
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The r e c e n t e x t e n s i v e purchases of coa l 
r e s e r v e s by a number of t h e w o r l d ' s 
l a r g e s t o i l f i rms i n d i c a t e s t h e s t r e n g t h 
of p o t e n t i a l commercial i n t e r e s t i n the 
modern p i t c o m p l e x e s of t h e UK c o a l 
industry . 
THE DISPUTE 
The immediate cause of the recent mining 
dispute was the announcement by the NCB in 
March 1984 of a cut in capacity of between 
four t o eight mi l l ion tonnes (implying the 
closure of approximately 20 p i t s ) . This 
a c t i o n by t h e NCB ignored and broke a l l 
t h e e s t a b l i s h e d procedures t o dea l wi th 
p i t c l o s u r e s which had l e d , l a r g e l y 
peacefully, to agreements being reached to 
close 122 p i t s between 1970 and 1983. 
The conduct of the s t r i k e i s su f f i c i en t ly 
w e l l known n o t t o w a r r a n t f u r t h e r 
r e p i t i t i o n . The consequences of t h e 
l e s s o n s of 1972 /4 can be shown by 
comparing t h e 1972 and 1974 s toppages . 
In 1972 power s t a t i o n s he ld 7.2 weeks 
supply; in 1984 they held seven months 
(p lus t h e a b i l i t y t o s w i t c h t o o i l i n 
addit ion t o s tockpi les held by the CEGB in 
Hol land) . In 1972 263 p i c k e t s were 
a r r e s t e d as a g a i n s t more than 9,000 in 
1984. Such s imple compar isons concea l , 
however, four s ign i f i can t fea tures of the 
conduct of the dispute which are l i ke ly to 
have a l o n g - t e r m i m p a c t on B r i t i s h 
indus t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
The f i r s t concerns t h e volume and manner 
of a r r e s t s and ba i l condit ions. From the 
beginning of t h e d i s p u t e i t was apparen t 
t h a t new p o l i c i n g t e c h n i q u e s were being 
a d o p t e d t o c o u n t e r a t t e m p t s a t mass 
picketing. The National Recording Centre 
f a c i l i t a t e d both t h e deployment of large 
numbers of p o l i c e in t h e c o a l f i e l d s , and 
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of r o a d b l o c k s a t 
c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e s from the p i c k e t 
l i n e s . I t i s e s t i m a t e d by the ch i e f 
constable of Nottingham tha t over 164,000 
individuals were stopped from entering the 
county in the f i r s t twenty-seven weeks of 
t h e s t o p p a g e , w h i l e i n S c o t l a n d , 
Motherwell was v i r t u a l l y cordoned off from 
the o u t s i d e wor ld . At p i c k e t l i n e s 
p o l i c e were ab l e t o draw on c o n s t a b l e s 
trained in r i o t control techniques. By the 
summer, as t h e p i c k e t s r e t r e a t e d t o t h e 
mining a reas , the focus of pol ic ing turned 
to the mining communities. Considerable 
d isquie t was expressed by, amongst o thers , 
the National Council for Civil L ibe r t i e s , 
r ega rd ing t h e t echn iques adopted in t h e 
' a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c i n g ' o f t h e s e 
c o m m u n i t i e s . F u r t h e r d i s q u i e t was 
expressed by the Na t iona l A s s o c i a t i o n of 
Probation Officers as to some of the ba i l 
c o n d i t i o n s which app l i ed t o more than 
4,000 of those charged. The i m p o s i t i o n 
of cur fews , d a i l y r e p o r t i n g t o p o l i c e , 
d e b a r r i n g from p i c k e t i n g , a t t e n d i n g 
m e e t i n g s / d e m o n s t r a t i o n s and e n t e r i n g 
specified areas was both a new approach to 
i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s and served t o weaken 
t h e NUM's a b i l i t y t o o r g a n i s e and man 
p i c k e t l i n e s . 
Whilst these new techniques were effect ive 
i n m a i n t a i n i n g l aw and o r d e r and i n 
l i m i t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n s of i n d u s t r i a l 
u n r e s t , they a r e not a s u b s t i t u t e for 
negot iat ion. Giving the police a cent ra l 
ro l e in disputes may shorten the duration 
of s t r i ke s but i s l i ke ly to exacerbate the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s in resolving the differences 
between management and employer and in 
r e c r e a t i n g a c o n s e n s u s which e n a b l e s 
e f f i c ien t production. 
By the end of J anua ry , 9,374 persons had 
been ar res ted , of which approximately 20% 
were never charged , a f u r t h e r 20% were 
a c q u i t t e d , 2 , 3 0 8 w e r e f i n e d and 141 
received prison sentences (with a further 
23 i n d e t e n t i o n c e n t r e s , 4 i n y o u t h 
cus tody , 21 remanded in custody and 9 in 
p o l i c e c u s t o d y ) . T a b l e s 2 and 3 
i l l u s t r a t e the changing policy of dealing 
with those ar res ted during the dispute and 
t h e r e l a t i v e l y low proport ion of v io lent 
offences. 
Cur ious ly , the beginning of t h e 'back t o 
w-ork' phase of t h e s t r i k e was marked by a 
r i s e in t h e pe rcen tage of charges which 
c a r r i e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of p r i s o n 
s e n t e n c e s , e s p e c i a l l y conspiracy charges 
under the 1875 Conspiracy and P r o t e c t i o n 
of Property Act. I t i s unclear why there 
should be such a p o l i c y change a t a t ime 
when the number of p o l i c e deployed was 
being reduced, and why an 110 year-old ac t 
s h o u l d be p r e f e r r e d t o t h e m e a s u r e s 
avai lable under the 1980 Act passed by the 
present adminis t ra t ion. 
Secondly, the d i s p u t e was a p p a r e n t l y 
marked by a general reluctance by the NCB 
and other nat ional ised indus t r ies such as 
s t ee l and r a i l who were closely affected, 
t o u s e t h e new l e g i s l a t i o n and i t s 
remedies a g a i n s t p icke t ing and secondary 
a c t i o n . I n s t e a d some 640 charges were 
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Table 2 Breakdown of charges (Nay 1984 -
January 1985) 
1984 1985 
31 May 10 Jul 25 Sep 29 Jan 
Obstruction/ 
breach of 2 ,352 3 ,4315 ,218 6 ,425 
peace (79?) (73%) (67*) (65$) 
Offences 
connected 
with 273 502 758 836 
violence ( 9%) (11%) (10%) ( 8%) 
Conspiracy 64 307 754 942 
e tc ( 2%) ( 6%) (10%) (10%) 
Source: Labour Research, March 1985 
Table 3 Fines imposed by the courts 
Nunbers fined by: 
Amount 
of f ine 24 Oct 11 Dec 1 Feb 
under £49 267 (21%) 505 (25%) 562 (24%) 
£ 50-£ 99 558 (45%) 843 (42%) 988 (43%) 
£100-^149 265 (21%) 391 (20%) 488 (21%) 
£150 plus 154 (12%) 254 (13%) 270 (12%) 
Source: Labour Research, March 1985 
brought under t h e 1875 Act, w h i l e t h e 
common law of t rus teesh ip invoked against 
t h e i r union by working miners t o g e t h e r 
w i t h o t h e r c i v i l a c t i o n s l e d t o t h e 
s e q u e s t r a t i o n of NUM funds. However, 
there i s no way of quantifying the degree 
to which the new employment laws acted as 
a d e t e r r e n t on o t h e r unions from p u t t i n g 
TUC Congress r e s o l u t i o n s on suppor t i n t o 
t h e form of p r a c t i c a l a c t i o n . With the 
exception of the r a i l unions, support for 
t h e NUM on the p a r t of o the r unions took 
place via f inancia l contr ibut ions only. 
In a t h i r d way t h e d i s p u t e was d i f f e r e n t 
from e a r l i e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s i n t h e 
p u b l i c s e c t o r . I n i t i a l l y both NUM and 
NCB ignored t h e t r i e d and t e s t e d methods 
of mediation and conci l ia t ion . Similar ly 
t h e Government chose not t o encourage 
i n t e r v e n t i o n by ACAS nor t o e s t a b l i s h a 
cou r t of i nqu i ry i n t o t h e c i r cums tances 
and p o t e n t i a l s o l u t i o n s t o the d i s p u t e . 
The Prime M i n i s t e r l e t i t be known t h a t 
t h e Government was prepared for a y e a r -
long s toppage , and half -way through the 
s t i k e the Chance l lo r , Nigel Lawson, t o ld 
the House of Commons tha t when the cost of 
the dispute (which a t tha t stage he put a t 
£350m) were balanced a g a i n s t the 1983 
subsidy t o t h e NCB (which he gave as 
£1bn+) then the s t r i k e r ep re sen t ed "a 
wor thwhi le i nves tmen t for the na t ion" 
(Hansard, 31 Ju ly 1984). S tockbrokers 
Simon and Coates put t h e e f f e c t on GDP a t 
t h e end of January a t £5.2bn). 
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t he d i s p u t e was a 
f u r t h e r e x a m p l e of t h e G o v e r n m e n t ' s 
r e f u s a l t o e n t e r i n t o c o l l e c t i v e 
bargaining as i t has been practiced in the 
public sector for the l a s t 65 years. The 
po l i cy of s t a t i n g a t t h e o u t s e t what the 
Government can ' a f f o r d ' , making t h e 
i n i t i a l offer in co l l ec t ive bargaining the 
f i n a l o f f e r , i s s i m i l a r t o t h e American 
labour r e l a t i ons p r a c t i c e of Boulwarism. 
The National Labor Relations Board in the 
U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s r u l e d t h a t such a 
t echn ique , which r e n d e r s the t r a d e union 
l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t , does not r e p r e s e n t 
bargaining in good f a i t h . The adoption of 
such a p r a c t i c e in B r i t a i n i n d i c a t e s the 
extent to which the Government has moved 
away from t h e t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f in f ree 
c o l l e c t i v e ba rga in ing as being t h e b e s t 
means t o e s t a b l i s h t h e t e r m s and 
conditions of employment for public sector 
employees and away from the t r a d i t i o n a l 
policy of encouraging and supporting t rade 
unionism in public sector employment. 
F ina l ly , unlike almost a l l other national 
s t o p p a g e s , t h e m i n e r s ' s t r i k e was 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a number of disquiet ing 
even t s and the c u r i o u s involvement and 
l inks of a number of individuals . Whilst 
a l l governments have monitored the act ions 
of those, including t rade unionis ts , whom 
they believe threaten the s t a b i l i t y of the 
s t a t e , few h a v e t r a n s m i t t e d such 
information to ' independent managements' 
such as s en io r e x e c u t i v e s of the NCB. 
The d i s c l o s u r e , however t r i v i a l , by the 
NCB of the s t a t e of h e a l t h of Mr S c a r g i l l 
i l l u s t r a t e s both the e x t e n t t o which the 
s t a t e act ively monitored the leader of the 
mine r s , and i n d i s c r i m a t e l y d i s semina ted 
t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , the 
d i s p u t e was marked by the c u r i o u s and 
arguably u n f o r t u n a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n of a 
number of individuals associated with the 
Conservative Party. 
The r o l e of David Har t , a d v i s e r t o Mrs 
Thatcher and MacGregor and i n f l u e n t i a l 
organiser in the formation of the National 
Working Miners' Committee, has been widely 
reported. Less well known has been the 
role of Tim Bell , another Thatcher aid, 
and ex-director of Saatchi and Saatchi who 
designed the working miners' publ ici ty 
m a t e r i a l . W h i l s t no t e n t i r e l y 
unexpected, i t was unfortunate that large 
numbers of the Conservative Party chose to 
become involved in the dispute as legal 
advisers. In particular, the acceptance 
by the PPS to the Attorney General, the 
Conservative MP for Mid-Bedfordshire, of a 
brief to act as QC for the Derbyshire 
miners r a i s e s ques t ions of p o l i t i c a l 
judgement and the involvement of senior 
Conservat ives in the conduct of an 
i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e . E q u a l l y 
questionable, was the support for working 
miners which came from groups associated 
with the Centre for Policy Studies or with 
f i n a n c i a l involvement in the mining 
industry. The action of Lord Taylor, of 
Taylor and Woodrow, in contributing to the 
working miners raises issues of financial 
propriety given his company's se r ies of 
prof i table contracts on operating open 
cast mines on behalf of the NCB. At the 
same time, the NUM's Libyan connection, 
i n i t i a l a loofness from the TUC and 
l e a d e r s h i p s t y l e weakened p o t e n t i a l 
support from w i t h i n the t r a d e union 
movement and encouraged the moderate 
s e c t i o n s of the NUM to pursue t h e i r 
independent line. 
THE FUTURE 
Quite c l e a r l y , the future indus t r i a l 
r e la t ions of the coal industry wi l l be 
dominated by the continuing process of 
s l i m m i n g down as a p r e c u r s o r t o 
privatisation. As la te as December 1984, 
MacGregor, while admitting i t was not 
a p p r o p r i a t e to mention p r iva t i sa t ion 
during the strike, ventured the view that 
"in the long-term there i s no doubt tha t 
opportunities like this will arise as they 
have done in other industries like British 
Telecom and British Airways". 
This will necessitate a continuing policy 
of weakening t h e union and union 
a c t i v i s t s , a renewal of the l o c a l 
productivity scheme and the breakup of the 
national negotiating procedure. 
Developments elsewhere in the pub l i c 
sector are harder to predict, although the 
same basic policy of reducing the power 
and influence of the trade unions will be 
a key element. The Ridley Report , 
a r g u a b l y t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of t h e 
Conservative Government's s trategy for 
public sector unions, focussed on the 
nationalised indust r ies and essen t ia l ly 
actions by manual workers. The strategy 
was not designed to respond to disputes in 
the National Health Service (the jo in t 
action by nurses and ancil l iaries) , Civil 
Service (especially action affecting the 
inputting of data to computers in the 
revenue generating departments) and in the 
current national action involving school 
teachers. The f i r s t general changes in 
the public sector w i l l be the extension 
and development of the basic strategy 
outlined in the Ridley Report to these 
sectors. 
Already the determination of pay and 
conditions for nursing staff has been 
withdrawn from the standing Whitley 
machinery for the NHS in the hope of 
reducing the likelihood of joint action by 
m e d i c a l and a n c i l l i a r y s t a f f . 
Contingency p lans have been made to 
regionalise the computer services of the 
major Civil Service departments and, thus, 
reduce the vulnerability of the Government 
to s t r ikes by such 'key' personnel. Sir 
Keith Joseph 's r ecen t s ta tement on 
transferring the whole burden of teachers 
pay to the r a t e s i s a logical f i r s t step 
to breaking up the national pay structure 
and leading to the determination of pay 
and conditions becoming a regional or 
county council decision. 
The p resen t Government's po l icy of 
dismantling the traditional practices and 
principles of British industrial relations 
may well r e su l t in major problems for 
future administrat ions. If col lec t ive 
bargaining can no longer be re l ied on to 
attain compromise between management and 
employees, and strikes are so constrained 
in their form and content that they can no 
longer exert an influence on management, 
i t i s likely that industrial conflict, far 
from withering away, wi l l take on new 
forms. A pol icy which ignores the 
u n d e r l y i n g r e a s o n s and v a l u e s of 
bargaining may, as this dispute has shown, 
produce an increasing po l i t i c i s a t ion of 
labour r e l a t i o n s and a b i t t e r n e s s 
manifested in a c t s of v io lence and 
sabotage. The Government's indus t r ia l 
relations policy may well engender neither 
a quiescent subdued labour force nor a new 
air of realism accompanying an economic 
upturn, but rather an underlying sense of 
revenge and injustice. 
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